# Talk | Overload the Execution Proposer instead (From MEV-Boost to ePBS to APS) (Barnabé)

- Channel: [ZuBerlin](https://streameth.org/zuberlin)
- Date: 2024-06-13
- Duration: 21:47
- Topics: cryptocurrency, blockchain, developers, fintech, economics
- Watch: https://streameth.org/watch/666af9a007f92b086c2c5117
- Download: https://vod-cdn.lp-playback.studio/raw/jxf4iblf6wlsyor6526t4tcmtmqa/catalyst-vod-com/hls/71932cl39zk8sb3z/1080p0.mp4

## Description

Clip The video features a speaker discussing the intricacies of precomp builders and the separation of attester and proposer roles within a blockchain network. The talk delves into various design concepts like PBS (Proposer Builder Separation) and APS (Attester-Proposer Separation), explaining their importance in mitigating centralization risks, reducing MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) reward viability, and providing a clean protocol interface.

The speaker elaborates on the conceptual differences between proposing and building rights, as well as between beacon proposing and execution proposing. They explore the current MEV Boost system where validators, acting as proposers, seek builders to determine block contents. The talk also covers EPBS (Enshrined Proposal Builder Separation), which involves fair exchange via protocol, allowing proposers to commit to builders within the network.

Further discussion points include the potential for different market structures under EPBS, questions about bid cancellations, and the concept of burning MEV to capture value from builder-to-proposer transactions. The speaker also suggests an iterative roadmap towards APS, with steps including creating a logical role for execution proposers separate from beacon proposers, running slot auctions in advance to capture bid value more effectively, and considering alternative designs like execution tickets.

The talk concludes by highlighting how