Prediction Markets, Regulation and the Fight Over What You Can Trade presented by Milbank
DC Fintech Week·Fri, Nov 6, 2026, 12:00 AM
In 2024, Milbank secured a landmark victory for Kalshi, overturning a CFTC order that had banned political event contracts and opening the door for Americans to trade on election outcomes for the first time on a regulated exchange. Since then, prediction markets have exploded into a multi-billion-dollar phenomenon, with people trading contracts on everything from sports and politics to pop culture and beyond. Now, the CFTC is proposing a sweeping new regulatory framework, federal preemption battles are playing out against states and tribes nationwide, and courts across the country are wrestling with where to draw the line between trading and gambling. Join Milbank's Derivatives team, led by former CFTC Division Director Josh Sterling and former SEC Chief Litigation Counsel Olivia Choe, for a candid conversation about what comes next. The panel will dig into how the legal battle over event contracts reshaped the regulatory landscape, why the CFTC's proposed rulemaking matters for every platform and market participant, and what the emerging circuit split means for the future of federal oversight. We'll also explore the next wave of financial products being built on this foundation, from sports event contracts to perpetual futures and security futures, and the state and federal enforcement strategies that could slow the momentum or redirect it entirely. Come ready to debate. • Josh Sterling, Partner, Litigation & Arbitration Group, Milbank LLP • Olivia Choe, Partner, Litigation & Arbitration Group, Milbank LLP • Jon Ammons, Special Counsel, Milbank LLP
Transcript
Thank you for joining us. We uh I'm John Ammons, special counsel at Milbank. Uh joined with uh
Hey, I'm Josh Sterling from Milbank. I think my mic's on now.
Hi, I'm Olivia Chae from Milbank as well.
We're going to be doing a breakout session about event contracts, prediction markets, kind of talking about what they are, a little bit of background, and then uh the legal fights that we're engaging in in the area, and um what we expect to see next. Just 25 minutes, so this is going to be a quick overview. Um not going to be able to get too much into the weeds, but um we'll try to leave some room for questions at the end. Um so I'm not sure how much familiarity everyone has with event contracts and prediction markets, so just to kind of kick things off, Josh, Olivia, um do you want to give a little overview of what event contracts are, um what prediction markets are?
Yeah, happy to do that. And hello everybody. I have to say I've never done one of these silent things before, so it's a little disorienting. I'll try and stand the right way for length, but um um you know, I think for those of you who've been here all day, I think um Tarik Mian Soor spoke this morning. Uh there's no greater authority on prediction markets and event contracts than he.
And I know walking in here I saw Brian Quintenz and Jamie McKenzie and others on screen talking about them as well, and they're great experts. So we'll talk a little bit about the the legal challenges there. Um we happen to be involved in approximately 40 lawsuits nationwide, um representing clients in the prediction market space, including one well-known exchange, um where we're being they're being challenged by the states, by tribal interests, which Olivia's intimately involved with, and some private plaintiff actions as well, over the legality of these contracts, and fundamentally whether they can be offered uh, on a federally licensed exchange regulated by the CFTC, or instead they have to be regulated by, you know, each individual state to the extent a state allows gaming in within the borders of that state. And so, really there's two fundamental questions at issue here as far as the main litigation involving about 20 states now goes. It's really this.
Uh, the first issue is, um, if you have a federally regulated exchange, is it subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC, and does that mean that state laws are therefore preempted in so far as the CFTC oversees trading on the exchange? We think the answer that question is yes. Um, we have three decisions by three different circuit courts of appeal now. Um, well, our client prevailed in one in the third circuit, at least two of the circuits, that circuit and the ninth agree that the federal statute, the Commodity Exchange Act, does in fact confer exclusive jurisdiction uh, to the CFTC, and what that means is no one else can regulate it, and that therefore it's a form of express preemption, which is a very strong form of preemption, and that's good. The second question we deal with, so that's the preemption question, is, okay, well, the CFTC um, has exclusive jurisdiction, let's concede that, let's say that, that means no one else can regulate, I'm with you there, but they can regulate the trading of what on these exchanges?
Uh, and what we have said is, well, the regulation of swaps, and so these contracts must be swaps because the swap definition in the statute is quite broad. Uh, it includes really any contract on uh, on an event or an occurrence that has uh, you know, potential financial, economic, or commercial consequences. That's quite broad. Uh it also includes things that now or in the future become known to the trade as swap as a swap. Um that's exceedingly broad as well and is meant to grow.
So, of course, these instruments are swaps. They're kind of an option. An option's a swap. Um we've run into a lot of different arguments as to why that is not the case. I think we've been successful in arguing back, not 100%, but fundamentally, does the Commodity Exchange Act preempt state law?
We think the answer is yes. And are these instruments event contracts swaps? We think again, the answer to that is yes. And so, those cases continue to make their way through the court.
So, just taking a step back though, what is an event contract? What and also how does it satisfy the definition of a swap or an option?
Sure. So, uh an event contract is known in the popular imagination and by our clients as essentially a question. The question is, will this happen? Uh yes and the answer is yes or no. And so, there's a binary element to it.
Um a lot of the contracts today are sized at $1 and so, you know, fundamentally, the yes side and the no side always sum up to a dollar. So, wager a dollar and you will get, you know, a dollar plus maybe the other side of the contract back. Or excuse me, wager 60 cents you get a dollar back if you're right. Um cuz the contract size is a dollar and costs you 60 cents to buy it. So, that's basically it.
Um how that is a swap is um well, it's an agreement that functions sort of like an option, you know, yes or no, a binary option. It will happen, it will not. Um and the definition of swap, as I mentioned a moment ago, picks up options. And it certainly picks up, you know, agreements, contracts, and the like that are sort of based on an event or an occurrence or the extent of an occurrence. Uh and it has a potential financial economic consequence.
So, for example, who wins an election? That's obviously something with tremendous financial, economic, or commercial consequences. So, too, with who wins a game. Sometimes for individual players in sports, uh what they do in a game will matter greatly to you for a variety of reasons, sponsorships and the like. And then many other kinds of contracts, including those on weather.
I mean, there's nothing inherently financial, economic, or commercial about weather, but obviously weather events can have huge consequences in the real world, hurricanes and and other such events being but one example of that. And so, I think it fits pretty neatly within there.
And so, Josh mentioned
[clears throat]
gave a brief overview of the litigation. Olivia, who's bringing the challenges to um event contracts and being federally regulated in prediction markets?
So, there's a few different flavors, as Josh mentioned. There's obviously a ton of litigation with the states, where they have both sued, but also been sued by prediction markets, um and by the CFTC, um fighting over really these issues, these big issues that Josh was covering as far as preemption, and the um authority of the CFTC under the Commodity Exchange Act, but also um the definition of these instruments and whether they fall within what the statute provides. Um there's also tribal litigation, which as Josh noted is something that I uh um personally have been handling, litigating, where unsurprisingly, um uh a few different tribes across the country have brought suits alleging that this constitutes gaming, the activity on prediction markets, largely focused on sports. Um and then there's some private litigation, like um Josh said, class actions. Um some obscure cases brought under particular state laws, um that also fundamentally rest on the assumption and the claim that this activity is illegal gambling.
And I think what's kind of interesting, you just stepping back for for a litigator, you know, you've got you've got a statute, you've got uh regulations, commission rules, and you have cases. And while actually the history of binary options and things like event contracts goes back decades, um there's clearly like innovation and growth in this space, and it's interesting to see in this industry, but I think more broadly in many industries when there is innovation and a new player, how does the law deal with it, and how can the law accommodate it? Is the law there protecting, you know, kind of established interests? Is there room in the law, the way that it's written and interpreted, to allow for this kind of innovation? Who is the law really protecting?
Um and and so I think we're seeing a lot of that play out in these cases, and really seeing courts um grappling with that.
So Josh gave a little bit overview of the state gambling commission litigation or the status of it. What's the status with the tribal litigation?
So fewer suits than in the states, um and you know, there has been sort of a mixed bag. Um early on a tribe in California had sought a preliminary injunction, um did not prevail in the district court, the ninth circuit recently um reversed and vacated and remanded for further proceedings. So that case is ongoing. Similarly, a case in Wisconsin involving a tribe there um sued, that case is now going up on appeal to the seventh circuit. So appellate activity in these cases as well.
And then there's a more recent case that's been filed by a few tribes in the in New Mexico, um seeking to um see asking the court to find that not just a federal statute related to Indian gaming, but actually tribal laws, tribal ordinances have been violated by prediction market activity. That claim is quite novel because obviously those those laws do not arise under, you know, Congress's authority. And so whether a tribe or more broadly, you know, 200 some odd tribes could impose their laws on a nationwide exchange is really a novel question.
Um so, obviously the litigation over whether these are gambling um contracts or um swaps options kind of front and center of our minds, but I've been surprised in talking with others, you know, maybe non-lawyers in terms of like what what they focus on in terms of uh event contracts and um and so, I'm wondering if you can just talk about kind of some of the other issues, some of the lurking issues that are coming to to a head with respect to event contracts and prediction markets.
Sure. So, um we've gone over sort of the central issues in the state litigation and the tribal litigation. Um and then I think there are a number of other questions that are out there on people's minds. I think if you turn on CNBC on any given day, uh Andrew Ross Sorkin or Becky Quick will be talking to someone or badgering someone about uh you know, insider trading. Um and so, those issues are developing in this area.
Um it's on at the top of everyone's mind because people think quite quickly and maybe not necessarily wrongly, well, um if there's an event and it may or may not happen and I have information about it, can I just place a trade and I can profit wildly. Uh I think the answer to that question is yes, that can happen. Um and then the following question is well, what who's supposed to do something about that? What's supposed to happen? And you know, I I'll zoom out in a second to talk about how insider trading is a little different here than in say the stock markets, but essentially um you know, there are a number of things that exchanges are supposed to do and I think that they are doing.
One is you have an obligation as a federal exchange with a federal license to list contracts are not readily susceptible to manipulation. And so if you think about it, um, you know, if you're designing a contract, you would want to make sure it's it's something that in particular it's not something that someone could could easily manipulate through activity in the market including on the basis of material nonpublic information. So that is sort of at the front end and you can try to do that, but invariably if you're asking questions in the form of a contract that has economic consequences and people want to trade them, there's always going to be inside information around that. Just like if you lost a stock, people are going to want to know what your earnings are. And people probably want to know before they're supposed to know.
If they could, they would and then they get in trouble. So that's one thing you try to do. Um, the other thing you do is you have to have an active surveillance program. You have to develop a framework for understanding kind of trading activity that could suggest to you people are trading abnormally in a particular contract at a particular time. Um, so that's sort of your monitoring and surveillance.
Then you actually have to follow up on it. You actually as an exchange are a self-regulatory body. You have rules, you enforce them. Um, you investigate and you can sanction people yourself um, through your own disciplinary process. The other thing you can do and should do is refer that out to the federal government if you have information that would suggest federal laws broken.
I mean, you can't absolve someone of that and if you're in possession of that information and your business, you probably want to tell the government about that and so it's been written up in the press. It's not a state secret. A number of these exchanges have indeed been referring problematic trading indicative of possible insider trading out to the federal government including, you know, uh, soldiers or people in the intelligence community who might have been trading around uh, conflicts overseas. Um, and you know, a former uh, member of Congress trading on the basis of information he shouldn't have had. So these are things that are all in process sort of focusing on material nonpublic information.
One of the challenges uh though is that um this market the derivatives markets borrows concepts of insider trading from the securities laws, and they're just different markets, you know. And and Olivia, having worked at the SEC in a very senior position, can talk about this, so I'll be very brief on it. Um those are, you know, capital accumulation, capital raising markets. People own stocks. Um and you want your stock price to have integrity.
I'm assuming they're not clapping at me. I can't tell that. Um Anyway, uh you know, and so that's very important. Conversely, in the derivatives markets, you just want to know what the price of the commodity is. And so if you happen to know like where tankers are in the Strait of Hormuz, like you should probably should trade oil contracts because your knowledge will be expressed and people will know what actually oil costs.
So it's a little bit different. So it's always hard to kind of fit traditional insider trading concepts into that market. Um and I think that effort is still ongoing. So there's a bit of a tension point there. I think people really focused a lot on that.
The extent it creates confidence in the markets, I think it's good to focus on that and to continue to improve.
Yeah, I think in the security space, which is where a lot of the concepts of insider trading come from and people think of first, um there there are certain doctrines, legal doctrines, that courts have built up over time where you've really got to have a breach of some sort of duty that you owe to somebody else. And there are different flavors of what feels like insider trading that have to do with deception, hacking into a system, misappropriating data, um or information that may or may not be tied to a breach of duty, and that's where you start to see conduct that may look or feel like insider trading be charged under different kinds of laws, whether it's wire fraud, um or commodities fraud, um authorities that the DOJ has, and in some situations the CFTC as well. Um so you there are like intricacies in what is the law governing the particular kind of conduct, but I do think that there are mechanisms to try to, you know, build confidence in market integrity um under a number of different laws, even if it's not traditional securities-based insider trading.
I want to leave some room for questions, but uh where do we see prediction markets going? Um sports is a big thing. What else are they getting involved in? What what other markets and products are they developing?
Yeah, so um as much as we might enjoy the work of litigation, and I'm not even a litigator, Olivia is is the litigator up here. Um there is a lot of excitement on the product side and the new market uh development side. And so we've seen a few developments. One is um there are uh there's talk out there, there might even be filings out there about potentially in the future listing event contracts that involve margin. Right now, these contracts are fully collateralized.
You put put your dollar down, you can trade a dollar. If it's $2, you need two bucks. So, there's been some some talk and maybe even some potential listings being developed that would allow that trading to happen on a leveraged basis. That would happen through a broker rather than you sort of trading directly on the exchange, I think. So, that's something that I think will take hold, and I think that's developing concurrently with um index products.
And so, if you have a lot of information about events um or any market, you can create an index on it, then you can start asking questions about different price points on the index. Um there are regulatory developments as well. Um the CFTC uh adopted a final rule on Friday um that sort of says um gambling is not swaps, which is pretty helpful. And then they proposed another one saying um kind of the opposite point, which is basically how would you how would you think of what is a swap? Um so, it's sort of a carve out and a bring in uh, that was focused on event contracts and so that's helpful.
But what you really observe in this space is a lot of these exchanges not a lot of them, but certainly some of the largest ones are are sort of looking at event contracts as sort of one vertical, but trying out other things as well that seem to really meet a demand or desire for innovation. So, a lot of markets that offer, um, event contracts are starting to and have offered perpetual futures contracts. These are contracts where, um, you know, there's really sort of no end date and the way you keep the alignment between the the price of the derivative and the price of the underlying asset is through sort of like a daily or intraday true up. The price sort of a financing charge. Um, so that's sort of a novel innovation.
Uh, the CFTC's actually being sued by that by one of these kind of legacy dinosaur exchanges. Um, so not everyone is moving in an innovative way, I suppose. Um, so you see a lot of developments like that and then I think you're going to see a lot of different contracts in sort of different sectors of the economy that are hot or getting hot and just on different sources of information like for people working on event markets for sentiment. Uh, there's people working on event markets for all different points in sort of the AI and compute and computer hardware space cuz there's some arbitrage opportunities in there. And so I see a lot of product development, um, which tells me that we're going to have these core challenges.
It's possible Congress might legislate even if, you know, power changes hands in the new Congress. But things are being built and taking root, um, in a rather organic way which I think is, um, pointing in the the direction of continued innovation.
I'll just say that if anyone wants to ask a question, you can step up to the microphone over there and, um, we'll open it up for that. Uh, what about institutional trading? Um, how is How is that being adopted? Um, uh, and in what ways are are the markets going about doing that?
Yeah. So, institutional trading certainly exists today. Um, you know, a number of these exchanges to work. The lifeblood of an exchange is sort of order flow and then the ability to meet order flow, so it executes. So, that would be liquidity providers.
And a lot of these liquidity providers are large institutions that trade. Um, some of whom we represent. Um, you know, I think there are also other opportunities for established businesses or not players per se to get involved. Um, I think certain weather contracts and political event contracts, things of that nature can be an attractive means to hedge sort of risks that exist for your business, but there's no precise hedge for it through like an interest rate swap or anything like that. It's thought it could be a responsible alternative to insurance in some circumstances.
Um, and I think possibly in in in some ways the introduction of leverage might increase institutional adoption because you'd be putting less money down than what otherwise be required. It sort of looks more like futures product you're comfortable with from historical usage. Um, things like that. I also think, you know, one of the um, earlier developments in this space was there was a company called Air Swap X that had created um, hedging contracts that were event contracts on sports, but they were only available, I think, to sports books and casinos, people with licenses. And so, they had a problem with that.
But if you think about it, sports books would be a natural kind of company to hedge here. Um, because they, you know, unless you can find another sports book with some offsetting risk, and maybe you can, um, you're looking to go to a bank or to insurance company or something like that. So, there are real opportunities I've seen uh, you know, some some uh, soccer teams or football teams internationally have insurance contracts to sort of hedge against relegation. Maybe you could do that in a prediction market.
Let's take this question here.
Yeah. Yeah.
Hi, um, Kelvin Toa at Theta Boiler. Um, the court definitely say prediction market is like swap and then CFTC is defending that, but the CFTC really didn't rule out that prediction market event contract can be a future. Right? And if you think about what prediction market is, the economic behavior is more like the insurance catastrophe insurance, right? Well, shouldn't we kind of like think from the insurance perspective like an insurance pool rather than trading cuz trading itself introduce so much noise to distort the signals of the forecast, right?
And insurance, the actuary, what they do is the quantitative model, right? To look at the outcome of the event, the probability. Just that this is not about a quantitative model, but solicit the crowd wisdom for the event outcome. So, what's your thoughts about like taking the structure away from all those trading, but focus it's more as an insurance pool?
I'll just say something brief cuz I I want to hear what you have to say, too. I just think there is value in information that and activity that happens on exchanges that reveals information. And so, I hear you there there might be some noise and insurance products get at this in a trying to figure out what the event is going to be in a different way, but I I do think exchanges offer value to our markets by allowing for information to be revealed through trading.
I guess one person's noise is is another person's information, but I'll leave everyone with sort of an example of this. Um it's not a not a happy example, but we all might recall or have learned of the Challenger disaster in 1986. Uh and I'll be as quick about this as I can, but you know, that happened and there was a presidential blue panel committee convened to figure out what went wrong. Um there were four or five external vendors to to NASA for uh parts uh for the this the space shuttles and um after several months uh they determined it was the provider of the O-rings. The O-rings broke.
Immediately, there was a lawsuit against the O-ring manufacturer and that years after it was concluded, I'll get the number wrong, but let's say that the the losses determined in that litigation were $200 million. The same day of the Challenger disaster, 2 or 3 years before that, the stock price of that company it actually went down within 10% of the actual recovery of loss 3 years later. They looked, there was no insider trading. So, I guess it's noise, but it's also highly informational. And if you want to read more about that example, I commend to you Andrew Lo's book, um Adaptive Markets.
He's an MIT professor and it's a great book. All markets are predictive and I think it could be useful. Thank you for the question. All right. Well, um thank you.
I hope that this was helpful, informative, and interesting. Um if you have any if you'd like to talk about prediction markets, we'd love to do it. Thanks very much. Thank you.
Thank you.
Automatic transcript — names and jargon may be misspelled.