From Event Markets to Information Finance | Clément Lesaege, Seer/Kleros | ETHTaipei 2026
ETHTaipei·Fri, Oct 16, 2026, 12:00 AM
Speaker
From Event Markets to Information Finance | Clément Lesaege, Seer/Kleros | ETHTaipei 2026
Transcript
So today we're going to talk about how we're going from a event market to a more global, maybe informal information like 50 billion in the last, it's all over the news and it even gets outside We also see that they are working pretty well. They've been able to provide a nice But currently, I would say, prediction markets as they are today tend to be more like a gambling which are providing some positive explainer of information but it's not the other way around the original vision where you want some information so you make market for it. It's not a market and, okay, you get some information as of byproduct. So, so this could remind me of the early days of crypto. So under the the Bitcoin, you had the quarter to half of the transaction which were just people gambling on satoshi dice.
With a serum, we had for more 3D and a bunch of gambling, or what they called ones ponzi, which was basically the gambling and ponzi because people knew, what they were playing. And we could say all like all of that was basically just time wasted. But no, actually, it was great at stress testing the systems. Great, I think that, we could have, I have a very large amount of protection on Bitcoin, for FOMO 3D, at some point, they were taking all the gas of SRM for three minutes. So those things, which for finance, prediction market are only one example of much larger in credit report for good for finance.
So the idea of information finance is that you want, a some information you want to take, a risk. You want to So let's see what we ae can do with. of proposal, a lot of a. a lot of them may be slop, and just evaluate all of them. So can we solve that with markets?
So we make a market where we ask which of those proposal will we and people can trade. re gonna print. this t t-shirt, are we gonna print this other t-shirt on it. and what we can see is that is bubbling proposal that we are likely to pick So now we can spend more time into looking at those because we know that So, here it's, yeah, very simple, we don't change a contract, we just do the same same type of contract as Polymarket and Calci. Okay, now slightly more complicated, we want to know if something is risky or not.
Well, that goes into the security, we had a token security before and one part of security might be how do you make stuff, and the other part of security might be how do we know So what we can do, we can get, we can market- Will this protocol be within a year? And we can see, the protocol will be at around 1%. Some protocol will be way, way, way, way- less. So we could be way less. I actually never heard of this before.
or not because if we do it which are deeply unbalanced we're going to get like 99% no 1% yes and if we do that the value of the yes side is going to be be dominated R by the capital cost and not of the likelihood of the protocol being broken. Like example would be in a market you had those Jesus market, real Jesus come back next year and it was giving one or two percent. pay 50 cent. Now you can have only one market and you can use the same capital on all of those those at the same time. Now you end-up which are deterministic but if you assume that those are independent, and they are not not independent, but binary markets okay now like we go into something completely crazy which is photography but values but bad belief and.
That's an idea of Robin and son, and here you just rribe a new form of governments just. So what is first you determine what you want so if you are a country who say I want I human and then you make a market So how do we do it? We do it by splitting the universe into two universes. One universe where you do something and one universe where you don't. And so, you can trade independently in both of those universes.
So for example for example, for Kleros, we have some KIPs. So some proposal and people can trade PNK. in the universe where the proposal is accepted and in the universe where the proposal is rejected. So they can say if this proposal passes, I want to buy PNK I want to this and now we have two conditional prices. and here we could see Okay, the pass price is higher than the fail price, this means that this proposal is likely to have an impact, a positive impact on price so we should probably do it.
So you you can go from a simple advisory, you can go from a hybrid system which is the particular you have one particular proposal, you both need votes, and to pass pass a footer key test to a system which are full on footer. and. And here, I think it's a, besides simple event market, that's probably the probably the second most developed category that we, we can see because because we have three different projects doing that. It started with metadao on Solana, I can watch and rate the top movies, and that's something to advise me in what I may want to watch. The first time we ran that, the results were kind of like, so so-so.
My own AI was over-performing the market in the first round, but then in the second round, the market was performing all the other predictors that we tried, and was actually perfectly predicting the ranking of the five movies that I ended up watching. so maybe it was luck or maybe the market became pretty good after the second round Rond but the is a bit of time for participants to adapt to become more sophisticated, for participants which were good to realize they are good. So, put more money, to participants which realize, realize that we are bad, to stop putting money, to stop making mechanism a mechanism to work. And we can do fancy stuff, you know, like. Like here we are doing for Defcon, we are making some side event.
And to show the side event, that we are making a market on what rould be the amount of attendee and what will be the rating given in the post event survey conditional on the type of event that we run and then we can try to maximize this composite metric which is combining combining two different prediction markets, to find but and we can.t get people to re which estimates' estimate the human evaluation, which estimates the value of something, and it acts both as people, they try to have, they tend I the good you, R but often this they are. Markets, a and on that. the idea of the the method is that you get multiple predictors and you try to. So if some of your predictors maybe non them, .
So, yeah, a you - aggregation and this only very particular If like you The A The A A A A A A A a A A A A A A AA a, and, as well,.,
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