Protecting Users from MEV | ETHDam 2023

foreign coming up next we have a panel discussion on protecting users from Mev strategies and solutions and I'd like to welcome Robert from all nodes to who's going to moderate the panel and to introduce the panelists yeah come up guys just come and grab your seats yeah uh wherever yeah just squish in there yeah move it closer why don't you let's start by thanking the people or for staying here after we did it really started on time so yeah thank you all for staying here thank you everyone so Mev right let's jump right into it it's uh it could be a a topic that takes all day um let's try to condense it into 30 minutes let's try to make it interesting so uh starting from left or right to left Let's uh introduce ourselves and also tell us how you work with Mev hi everyone my name is Sue I'm ecosystem development at block native we started our project about four years ago we provide real-time data streaming into the mempool as well as you know the Dark Forest so we want to illuminate the Dark Forest providing an equitable playing field for everybody we also did a little bit more tooling around gas fee so as you know before you might have a congested you know time in the mempool so we did that real-time gas fee and now post merge we also operate the open source relay and as well as we're block Builder on ethereum so that's how we go into math cool Elias can everybody hear me cool um I'm Elias I'm co-founder and CEO at rated we're building uh we're on a mission really to build the most complete picture of ethereum infrastructure including validators how about there's performance sort of risks they carry but also like this increasingly complex transaction value chain that involves builders that involves relays and so on so you can find this under radio.network we have a dashboard that we basically expose all of this in what we think is a pretty uh interesting and easy to consume uh way and we have like a bunch of other things that we're working on that are out of scope for this conversation hi everyone URI CEO and co-founder of blocks route um blog we're called blocks route because we route blocks and transactions so we have a blockchain distribution Network we propagate transactions and blocks roughly the speed of light under 140 milliseconds globally um we got into Mev because prior to flashbot and before all of that when D5 started and you know summer really started in summer of 2020 then a lot of people wanted to see the latest block really fast and wanted their transaction sent to the Val to the mining pools really fast to make the best trades and see what other trades are happening so they could also trade on C5 Etc and as you know flashbot came out private transaction became even more of a thing and now post merge or a major block Builder we're a relay we also provide Mev solutions for BSD for polygon also have our solutions for Solana so basically everything that comes down to D5 execution which Mev is a part of hello I'm Luis I'm a product manager at shutter Network and shutter network is a Mev protection mechanism I'm using threshold encryption so essentially providing an encrypted shielded mempool um we are implementing so essentially primarily targeting it to be a plug-in to uh other protocols like an L2 or even an L1 the most advanced um we are um sort of with implementing it is um with the gnosis chain so there we are essentially working on a version of what we would call a shutterized beacon chain um so that will be probably the first um yeah shutterized infrastructure in this way and then we also have the same sort of virtual encryption commit reveal scheme running um to Shield votes um and there is a plug-in to snapshot so if you have a snapshot dial you can switch on this shielded voting using the same threshold encryption that we would use for Mev protection cool thank you so I'd like to throw this to the audience wake you guys up a little bit hello wake up everyone it's Mev um by a show of hands who knows what Mev is this is a pretty crypto audience okay so I'd say like I don't know what would you guys call that 70 89 wow very precise so for that for the 10 left uh URI do you want to tell us like really quickly what Mev is but more importantly why is it good why did it come to be sure um so MAV or Mev maximal extractable value is basically the money that validators could capture but from being the one building the block that means mostly imagine price on D5 and price on C5 is the same now price of eth on binance goes up and there's an Arbitrage opportunity validators are the one in the position to capture and extract that value if somebody is making a giant trade okay somebody buys lots of eth and is going to move the needle and increase the price of eth then you could imagine it will be worthwhile for the validator to buy and front run that transaction by before the price goes up and then once price goes up sell these Eve so this is called sandwiching thrown from the transaction and background these are the main types of Mev are there also liquidation okay some collateral gets out some position is under collateralized they can be the one jumping to extract value so there is a lot of money in the being the ones ordering including excluding transaction in the block so this is what mevs in general more specifically and within the ethereum ecosystem we now have an Mev ecosystem where we allow people to optimize and maximize and do all sorts of stuff regarding Mev and the question I really want to answer is why the hell did we build it is that is that a good thing that we build it if this extract value from users I have some strong opinions around why it's bad and why it's good Etc there is one thing which is important and the reason this entire thing exists and as an infrastructure right now Valley if there's money there then validators would extract it okay if we don't do anything about it then large validators with a lot of stake could hire good Engineers to build good infrastructure and when they build blocks they extract a lot of value well if I run a solo validator at home I don't have these resources and my block won't be nearly as valuable so their apy would be seven eight percent my apy would be four percent and in that case you could imagine that most people oh what should I do with my Stakes should I solo stake or should I stake with coinbase or Lido or or rocket pool or whoever and everybody would stake with the largest and the largest one will be the best and kind of it's a very strong centralization force and so the reason infrastructure because this is to say well If instead of each validator building it by themselves we allow validators to offer it to third parties anybody could offer me a block this guy offers one if this guy is 1.1 this point okay this guy give me 1.2 I'll sign his block um and so and who the different block Builders kind of like you know they keep a percentage to themselves but they make an auction out of it then that allows all validators to get the same API we get rid out of this centralization Force I have a lot to say about the bad stuff about it and why it's not we'll get to that we'll get to that I know but that is the good thing the reason to have an Mev infrastructure is to say listen we really don't want that so we need a solution not for everybody want to stake with the largest validator thank you um so let's get right to what Erie was talking about which is the bad uh we can position this I think from a user experience um so you know starting with yusu what are the challenges facing the user interaction with Mev what are the bad experiences and what what are people like yourselves or like your company trying to sell for yeah I think that's a really interesting question and it has come a long way as well so in the really original urge version of Mev pretty much years ago and it happened what happened really bad is that it's just like really congested Network high gas fee because there are Searchers just trying to spam the ecosystem and then you have the flashboss version of the math gas which are then trying to have a private channel for the Searchers so they're already kind of mitigating partially the negative side of the math and I think as of now they come a long way it's pretty competitive landscape as well and the question is really how much are users aware of this and I would say maybe we're still like so many general public you know Awareness on the topic and it's also how much is implemented at the depth level so does your D5 protocol provides an MV protection to you does the wallet you know enable some kind of that and I believe there's going to be a topic for this year for the next seven eight months and so they start in the communities about math share ring so it's about how to empower users how to share some of their method words back to the users and how can we Implement that in a really simple UI ux at the depth level thank you um we'll continue on this subject a bit but Elias you sort of monitor this across the spectrum of Builders Searchers Mev in general how are you looking at it at rated in terms of like I guess just data analysis what are you seeing what are you looking at um we're still largely in like an exploratory phase because the ecosystem is also developing like super fast right so we're in we're in a place where we're trying to understand basically what sort of the implicit contracts are between this new emergent value chain right like a serger a builder promises something to a Searcher and expects something in return then the relay promises something to a builder and expects something in return and then the relay promises something to the validator and expects something in return vice versa so this is all just like happening pretty much live and happening super fast and like new versions are coming out and like you know there were relays and others optimistic relays and then tomorrow maybe this is going to be really there's not going to even exist in zone that it is even hard to actually grok what these implicit relationships are but where the disconnect uh and I'd love to hear what worry thinks about about all this the disconnect is in that there is so much value at stake no pun intended um and these agency relationships are actually not very clear right and and then the whole sort of Spiel behind the thing that we're we're doing and we're we're moving towards is this idea of a reputation for machines right and the objective functions that these machines the builders The Searchers the relays and the validators themselves sort of carry through as sort of Agents of their operators the people that tune them um can actually also we think can be used in interesting ways to express preferences right and minimize or maximize different types of objection functions including maximizing minimizing um Mev yeah you bring up a really interesting point uh there's like the ethereum assembly line right uh and so as we move down this road uh early how do you think the roles between all these entities in the assembly line will maybe evolve what are their roles even yeah so I was thinking let's start by for those who are not spending all their day all the time inside the Mev space say like oh what parties do we have here and what are they doing so we have users they're making transactions right we have this rule we have Searchers Searchers are out there listening to transaction in the mempool maybe or maybe not have access to some private order flow just people sending transaction just to them and they're looking to extract Mev it could be people just trying to extract that value it could be a service to say oh I'll protect my users I'll kind of like I'll take that I'll extract the value and give it to them so if there's no money left on the table these are the Searchers they create what's called bundles of transactions then you have block Builders block Builders listen might be surger themselves might not risk receive these bundles from other Searchers and try to make the most valuable block they also might have private order flow so people sending transactions just to them and trusting them not to front-run them or to background them and give them their money back and these kind of service and similar services so we have Searchers giving their bundles to block Builders block Builders aggregating trying to make the most valuable block now you could imagine there are some like relationship between bundles one Searcher does one bundle the other does a different one and maybe combined to make more value okay so this isn't visible to anybody to each individual Searcher but the block Builder could try to make the most valuable block from that um block Builders are fairly centralized right now we have like one of them controls like 30 and the other like 20 and then another 20 and so it's kind of like we're talking about very few actors um with this access and then in theory the block Builder would offer try to make the most valuable block let's say it paid Cree it captures one and a half eth and then one other said well I'll give 1.4 to the validator the proposer of the next block and then there'll be an auction however if the block Builder just give it to the validator you could imagine the value say oh thank you for building this I would throw your cut I'll take the whole 1.

5 I will change that block and I'll extract all the value so the validator could screw over the block Builder on the other hand there it's also the other way around the block Builder can just say oh sign this and I will pay you because maybe he doesn't he doesn't give him 1.4 he doesn't give him anything so they have a problem of trust who can screw over who and so we have another entity between them called the relay the relay is a trusted party okay this is ethereum right now most people are unaware how it works the black Builder gives the relay the block really looks inside oh it is actually paying 1.4 it goes to the valley there's like sign this I promise you it's 1.48 it would actually pay you that amount the validator signs it and the relay extend it to everybody else so this is kind these are the different pieces out there you have the Searchers you have the block Builders the relay and the proposer this is very different from vanilla ethereum peer-to-peer Network in a lot of ways I got a question shoot um I think it will add interesting context to everybody if you also talk a little bit about what modulates block value all other things being equal sort of outside of this uh uh value chain let's say that you know there's a constant flow of transactions and that's kind of a given what are the parameters that will actually that actually Define what the competitive landscape looks like right like how do how does half of Mev is c5d5 arbitrage okay think about it there's this isn't live stream or anything so there's shitload of liquidity sitting on uni Swap and It quotes price and these price are 12 second stale okay there is a price right now you could imagine that within 12 seconds this price is wrong so all the C5 D5 arbitragers you know the high frequency trading in crypto you all know their names they are all trying to capture that value so it's priced on coinbase and binance to go up but they're kind of okay they'll send their transaction they'll try to buy low on D5 and then sell high on C5 or vice versa and so C5 defy Arbitrage is by far the largest piece out there the second piece is front running or sandwiching which I mentioned earlier um an interesting point on this is that people think well if you make a transaction if you just don't put too much slippage and you should be good right you won't get sandwich you do you make the curve you created it just fine um shout out to P mcguin who built like zero mapping you can go there put your address and see how much money you lost to sandwiches I learned that oh and I'm not a big Trader at all I'm busy I lost something like four thousand dollars two sandwiches and I didn't even know it and I know probably more than 99.9 of the people about Mev so when you make a transaction you say well what's the current price on uni swap bulb I'll buy at that price um and you put zero sleepage why would you allow for sleepage if the real price centralized Exchange price went during this time down then you over a paid right you will be sandwiched somebody will come there and say like oh this guy's willing to pay for so much so okay let's let him buy this price and then afterwards kind of like sell and correct the price so when the C55 arbitrager come and correct applies price you'll be sandwiched along the way so they extract value from you if the price went in the different in the other direction so price went up you're under paying so your transaction would fail right you send a transaction you want to buy it at 2000 each what do you know now it's 2 100.

okay you're not getting it so you add some slippage because you don't want your transaction to fail at which point you always get sandwiched you either overpay this way or overpay the other way the only way for you not to be sandwiched is if you guess correctly what the price would be in six seconds so you set the slippage just right or close enough so you I don't know what the price would be and if you can do that well you shouldn't be here you should be running jump or something does that answer the question Elias thank you both uh um sort of I was also wondering if you could touch on what so Builders basically compete with one another and Searchers compete with it is my understanding right and then you have this like really sort of key pivotal dumb uh object in in the middle between Builders and validators which is the relay now what are sort of the the resources that Searchers and Builders use as an input to compete with one another is it like CPU is it like uh access to order flow is it like a combinatorial problem could you could you talk to that a little bit so first of all order flow and access to private order flow is a really big thing but really much worth mentioning Searchers these guys who look for opportunities don't really want to trust the builders the builders are also researchers almost always and so generally they wouldn't want to give them their bundles and trust them but you could imagine that if there's a block Builder and he's building 30 of the box if you don't send him your bundles you're losing outcome 30 of the opportunities so researchers are kind of like forced and don't really have an option and have to trust the block Builders and send them their bundles they don't really like they don't they can't do much about it usually it is the block Builders or a lot of the time it is a Blog that has additional order flow they have to actually spend quite a lot of effort in simulation and computation so as in these 12 seconds between one block and the other it is really the last 200 millisecond that matter the most we reach the money time okay what's the the price difference between C5 and this is where everything starts okay new updates and this one offered this amount and that one offers that amount and it goes into risk and latency to centralized exchanges and all these other things and then they create that and now block Builders give it to the relays relays or like as somebody who runs a relay block native also runs a relay flashback runs the ultrasound and agnostic are the largest one we're nice people so you both basically just trust us to relay them and not to screw everybody over and we have no instance we actually have a strong incentive to screw everybody over and basically you all just trust us not to do it yeah Yuri what what's what's preventing so I work for a node operator we have two relayers here what's preventing us from or what's not preventing us from collusion so why don't we make a deal in the background so just yesterday somebody said why are you running a relay and you or you should run a relay because it makes you minus like this pays no money so like oh so you're probably just an extension of a block Builder right like no I can't be an extension because I'm being trusted by the node and by the it's like why are you running it and I said that's a great question but not not really good answer for it and so the relay sits in the middle you could imagine that the relay could do whatever it wants I get a block I can unbundle it front run background extract do whatever I want to the Searchers promise I will pay you a million a hundred million dollar if you sign this block you trust me so you signed it I give you nothing I take all the money I walk away and so yes I'll do that I know where you live you move and you do it more than anything you do it anonymously there isn't an incentive right which is which is like in in classic uh like Game Theory you have like one short games and you have multiple round games and then the the incentive structure in one shot games is completely different than the multiple round game right so if it were a One-Shot game so like we all like gather round we place our bids there's only one block in the history of the universe and that's it then surely that's the dominant strategy right like you grief everybody and then you go home and you retire in some like exotic island in a multiple rounds game where you're also like have an organization that you're building and you're trying to like promote the interest of the ecosystem and and grow it then because you have a long-term view then argument to be made that there's actually a pretty strong incentive to act virtuously so so yeah yes and no um in this long yes and no and we would just move on um we're as a relay or the current Mev infrastructure is trying to say well we're trying to have as little value leak in the middle to the relay and the Builder and the Searcher so if you have an auction basically everybody try to auction up one another and whoever pays the most get it so it's kind of it leaves the least value possible and all the value go to the validators and from there to their stakers so Steve id5 arbitrages make money so that's their their game like they make actually good money um Searchers make some money block builders make some money relays don't nothing but like we're not being like this is a free service that we're giving that gives literally gives us nothing in return just to add something here and I think it's also most often also ignored how much value that really carries first of all the blogs produced by the relay carry small transactions that means that we're producing we're using the block space more efficiently you have more fees burned as well and second of all it can also be negative right because sometimes if that happens there there will be something missed you know you'll be coming validator coming to us you we want to be payment back so until a lot of real critical infrastructure we've got to be one percent uptime you're 100 connectivity and you need High CPU to do full simulation so I think there's a lot of value just being ignored and well with no economic incentive yeah yeah so to sum up relayers don't make any money and we're trusting people I I think the not making money is the less important part the idea is that we're talking about like Mev Solutions out there math blocker like we created like background me like two years ago I think Black Knight you guys have I think one I thought you have okay so but you have a lot of like mevs oh I think cow Swap all these stuff we say okay listen we're creating this and we're protecting the users and that is correct but eventually that block with these transactions go to the relay and the relay because like oh I'm just going to take this unbundle it do whatever I want and then promise whatever I want to the validator and that's it so it's not really protection it's trust and you know you can trust and and it works until it might not so I'm very bullish and almost hawkish on defy being useful being competitive alternative to C5 and there's something very very nice about vanilla ethereum peer-to-peer propagation and everything around where it said like you really send it out there and and don't need to trust anybody or third party Etc and there are negative stuff which I'm sure Lewis can kind of like a bit talk to to to on the solving side it's gonna this is the structure that you're all currently using if you're using like a Mev protection to protect your trades you really just like trusting them or trusting it eventually ask the relays not to screw you over and you know we're nice people we don't intend to screw you over but it's not really a robust incentive aligned mechanism which is what blockchain is all about right you don't do you don't like validators you trust that their incentives is to produce blocks that include your transactions except easy over there he likes validators yeah I mean that brings up the high level point right there's no de-incentivization built into how this all operates so let's pivot the conversation there's a lot of Solutions on the table there's a lot of roles on the table it you know it changes every week almost Louise to bring you in the conversation uh could you talk a bit about shutter how how you guys are sort of looking at solving for this yeah yeah you say you're saying like it's very correct I think there's a bunch of solutions right and not a single solution is going to solve everything in a way PBS is one sort of broad solution that unbundles everything helps with sort of the tendency towards centralization I would say all kinds of sort of auction mechanisms are also part of the solution I would say but maybe to um sort of focus on on the solution or the one sort of piece of the solution we're working on so if that the mempool encryption um maybe to motivate this a little bit so um right so Yuri is talking about um sort of these trust assumptions for various centralized intermediaries um along the the Mev supply chain and essentially the encryption is one sort of idea and one one tool we would have to reduce the trust assumptions right so so if you think about it the the on the larger time scale we have decentralization right as a tool to to combat the the need for trust um on these very small time scale sort of the five to ten second time scale um then decentralization doesn't really work there because there's only one entity in this small time scale with I mean so so the nice thing about encryption is it allows us to do something to achieve something similar by saying the one who for example The Rock producer has to sign on top of has to sign the inclusion and The Ordering of um and transactions that are still encrypted so they don't see what's in introductions so ideally then they also can't um censor a front-runner but very simple very simply spoken how it works is you um your encrypt transactions at the user level ideally you they they pass them to the Rock producer the block producer yeah signs on on these um batches and signs um and commits to an order of to an auto inclusion of transactions while not seeing them while it's still encrypted and only then afterwards is it is it being decrypted and executed um and the I think the important part of it also this need kind of needs to be in protocol right because as you said if you build it up build it outside of the protocol you can then sneak in transactions afterwards again or you can unbundle the the bundles um so it kind of needs to be in protocol this is why it takes longer a little bit longer time yeah maybe one note on sort of this multiple I would say encryption methods right you could use um something like Intel sgx which is probably a practical solution right now but yeah you kind of trusting sort of the hardware side of it Intel um shutter would work shooter Works using threshold encryption which where you're more sort of relying on the cryptography and the the decentralization of the the keeper set that are sort of generating these these key and this distributed key generation mechanism yeah can I push against that for a second sure g'day what can I push against that yeah go I think what bothered me the most about the Mev landscape is that we don't have good enough Solutions so you could say okay let's encrypt all the transactions so we send in this way it seems like it solves it by definition though if we encrypt it and then wait for majority of the validators or whatever to kind of do a threshold encryption so until we see what's inside it we slow everything down that's the trade-off here we can like okay they don't see it a you could do statistical spamming it's kind of like well I'll send a transaction maybe it catches Mev like and if there is mev2b Cash caught it will catch it so you spam the network with transactions that might try to blindly try and catch transaction Mev and the second that it slows everything down and I probably I probably feel strong more strongly about it than almost anybody else in the ecosystem I want to defy to compete with C5 I don't want to be like a side card where the real trading happened on C5 and you know Arbitrage is being caught on D5 that sucks and so if we slow things down we make things worse the faster if I'm I'm a big hedge fund trade entity whatever I send a trade I want to get the current correct price I want it to happen with the current price and I want to know whether it executed or not I can't wait well let me wait 12-15 seconds and then maybe I'll get it at the price it will be yeah so so that's the strong trade-off IC yeah in encryption which makes it not you know it's not the Silver Bullet that solves everything I agree definitely not the sellable but maybe it's too um sort of aspects of this one I would say is um I think in the previous panel we talked about they talked about the difference between inclusion latency and execution latency so it's a sometimes so in an encrypted system you can still have instant inclusion latency what you don't have is the the instant execution latency survey so it could matter to the user more to have the instant inclusion latency um that's really the one thing I would say and we can still provide that in the encrypted system and the second aspect I would say is is more around this topic of the trade-off between latency and geographical decentralization so I think Philadelphia had this great blog post where he said if we want to have geographical decentralization we sort of can't have super fast latency um so I feel like one answer could be that maybe we have to accept sort of a certain minimum kind of tick size and that's something that they that that you know they're also trying in the real world the these mtfs or or attack or these sort of alternative trading facilities um they have this minimum sort of latency like I IEX I think is one of them um so I think that that would be the the second aspect um just to add on here I think there are General like kind of two camps at Mev so you have the one Camp that's saying how do we just eliminate this we don't want this at all and I'm not on the more the second cam which is kind of like Mev is kind of like a part of the nature of any economic system so if there was like a transfer of value to be there there will be somehow unavoidable some people try to extract them and I guess I'm always looking at the perspective how can we leverage that so right now you know if you guys follow a bit more than ethereum protocols so people are talking about math burning mess smoothing and you know as I mentioned before how do we stop at the depth level with the wallet so that's more about math sharing so I think this is how I generally look at more MVP topic now just like I don't want this anything at all there's probably like well we mentioned there's probably good side and bad side and now with a math boost relay I mean the stickers are also getting more higher yield just because from the MV boost so yeah interesting interesting to note for for everybody basically lower latency means higher block value right or what's or really because because we talked a lot about latency um what's the real role of latency in this whole new value chain so two things first of all there was this idea where you know if we do an auction then latency doesn't matter and everybody are kind of like on equal ground and then I said earlier it turns out that it really is about the last 200 millisecond and here about so it's still that and asses relays basically we need to Res let's say somebody just created a more valuable block I need to receive it and simulate it in prop when be ready for the validator to come and ask for it and whoever is the fastest at it would accept so it's still there we didn't really get out of it for me personally the female I feel very strongly about is if Defy is slow and LP is continue to bleed money because they only make like bad they don't trade up and down and up and down kind of like as price Factory they only make one bad trade every 12 seconds and bleed out money then yes there is we extract that value and we get higher apy to stakers and maybe MVP burn and it increases the value of Eve this does nothing to help the LP's bleeding money okay this is like great it's great for many other people it's not better for the LPS if LPS are bleeding money they're not going to LP okay they're not going to put liquidity there if it's not going to grow and compete with with C5 um one interesting data point is that on C5 BTC trading volume is twice as much as ethereum trading volume regardless what you think of whether BTC is good or bad like it doesn't matter it is being used on C5 on D5 it's half a percent of the C5 volume okay why because if you hold BTC do you make more money if you trade it on C5 or if you you know use wbtc and LP it if you'll do that you'll bleed money so ah as if heads and D5 Maxis I might say like okay we'll put our money there like it's a good thing we're supporting the ecosystem or whatnot Etc it's not a very smart economic decision you could dynamically manage yours like if you're a giant hedge fund and you're kind of like okay you keep changing your position and how you LP then it's actually a good deal but it only works if you have really a lot of money so the gas fees are kind of yeah who cares about that and so is D5 useful BTC trading volume indicate that it isn't and so going back to your question I want D5 to be useful device has a lot going for it okay no kyc transparency it's not going to pull an FDX on you and disappear without it really has good stuff working for it but on C5 when I make a trade I get the correct price whatever the price I again I'm not trying to be faster than jump I want the current price I just want to get whatever is the fair price right now that's what I'll get on C5 and on D5 I will get the worst possible execution okay that's what I'm going to get I will be front run I will be sandwiched the worst thing that I could that's what I'm getting and that's not good enough so when I'm thinking latency I want people to trade get the current correct price Etc that's what drives me at least so um I think what we're running out of time guys sorry about that um we're already over so as you guys could tell Mev is like such a vast topic it could really take up the whole day we didn't get to touch on Mev Byrne Mev share all the things going on so I'll just throw this and and um just to note a lot of people did ask questions I hope most of them were answered um but since we're running out of time just for the sake of that I'll just throw this to all the participants sort of a two-par question what do you see over the next six months and and more importantly maybe what excites you over the next six months in terms of the Mev landscape yeah I think this is probably going to be an exciting year on other floor auctions so what I mentioned uh the volubus which we call it the math share at block native and I think there's already a lot of exploration you know costlife is kind of batch auction space but I think we will probably see a little bit more implementation at the wallet level which is the code and code sleeping giant at the math space and I think that's gonna Empower a lot of users then I'm excited to see how this in protocol PBS roadmap pans out to uh to look like right because like the the one of the most fun and also maybe not fun things about this industry is that you know the most permanent things sometimes are the most what are tattered as the most temporary so you know the relay is like an agent that is about or is slated to be abstracted away from the whole pipeline but some things planned sometimes plans change right so there's already kind of fast uh developments and changes so USM I think launched the optimistic relay there's a Mystic relays this mechanism that basically reduces the latency that the relay Builder validator relationships are beholden to increases value introduces some new risk this is like step one and my understanding is that within in the next six months we're gonna see like step two and potentially like the next evolution of of that so I guess that's that's what I'm mostly uh excited about cool I will just chill for a second so we're doing like an Mev talks side event today at 6 30. like why is that a bad thing I'm excited about that I'm excited about.com we can we're going to continue this conversation there I am very excited about ways for defy to compete with C5 that's literally the thing that drives me and that's the reason why like I'm doing anything that I'm doing in this space that's the thing okay that's since FTX imploded I like we need to build better defy so users choose D5 over C5 otherwise we're going to have con FTX and sales using Voyager that's the thing that drives me I'm I'm also excited about the the evening event um and then uh encrypted mempools obviously and also I would say the in this connects with to the to the previous panel sort of some of these some of these different opinions on how what what the perfect marketplace with the perfect sequencing engine looks like um the nice thing about these roll ups is you can sort of experiment and you can have one roll out with using these properties and the other one the other property so this is what excites me is that there will be many roll ups and they will have and they will have the MAV sort of um strategy as a as a differentiation um Factor so all right well uh I guess that's time thank you all the participants thank you everyone for listening