The Post-Quantum Financial System | DC Fintech Week 2026
DC Fintech Week·Tue, Nov 3, 2026, 12:00 AM
Financial data encrypted today may still be vulnerable tomorrow. Moving payment rails, settlement systems, and long-lived records to post-quantum cryptography will take years, making delay itself a source of risk. This panel examines emerging standards, supervisory expectations, and what a credible migration strategy looks like before the threat becomes operational. • Moderator: Kabir Kumar, Partner, Flourish Ventures • Robert Karr Jr., Partner & Quantum Technology Industry Group Co-Chair, Barnes & Thorburg LLP • Jerome Johnson, Director of Professional Services - US Federal, Defense & Aerospace, Amazon Web Services • Ryan McKenney, Director of Government Relations, Quantinuum • Katie Arrington, Quantum Technical Evangelist, IonQ
Transcript
We are in for a treat. I believe this is the first time at DC Fintech Week we are talking about quantum computing. So that's a pretty big deal and you got to realize very soon why it's a very big deal. Katie's already dancing. Um I'm going to ask each of the panelists, the remaining three, to quickly introduce themselves very quickly because we have less than 30 minutes for this conversation and then why you're here and why you're part of this conversation.
Okay. Hi everyone, my name is Ryan McKinney. I'm the director of government relations and general counsel of compliance at a company called Quantinuum. We're a quantum computing spin-out from Honeywell. Uh and I'm here I'm also a lawyer by trade and so I'm here to talk about both industry state of the art for where quantum is actually at as well as some of the regulatory implications of PQC.
Great. I'm Bob Carr, a partner at Barnes & Thornburg law firm. I co-chair our quantum technology industry group. Uh also as the lead architect lawyer architect on a document called the uh quantum law navigator published by the Chicago Quantum Exchange uh late last year.
Hi, I'm Katie Errington. I am not a lawyer. Yay me. Um I am I work for a company called IonQ. I'm a quantum evangelist.
Um I we are the first well not the first but publicly traded quantum company, full stack. So I own everything from my semiconductors to the optical terminals all the way down. Um I have a very different background. I was the CIO of the Department of War and the chief information security officer for DOW. I came to this company because of quantum and what it was what it's going to mean to you out in the audience.
So that's why I'm an evangelist and not a lawyer.
Yes, sir.
I'm Kabir. I'm with Flourish Ventures. We are global fintech fund. You already heard from Jerome earlier and we've been having a great conversation in the green room. I mean I mean, a phenomenal conversation.
You're going to only get a little flavor of it in 30 minutes. So, you have to find Katie and her team later on as a start to get to the bottom of this. So, I'm going to start with you, Katie, and with you, Ryan. Q-Day, there's a lot of noise about it. What should financial institutions and regulators, how should they assess the movement to Q-Day?
What should they be doing today to think about what's happening with Q-Day in the future?
You want me to go first? Go ahead.
So, quantum for years has been thought about this voodoo down the road. There's It's not if, it's when Q-Day happens. And I'm going to tell you Q-Day is going to happen faster than you think with the advancement of AI. There are some people that say early '30s, I say closer to '27, '28, but that's
And Katie, Q-Day is
The world changes. So, when Q-Day happens, and it's not the end of the world, it's a different world. It means that basic encryption that most people use will be broken. And the most non-attributional attacks to the most, I would say, weakened or open environments, networks will have adversarial influence and do bad things. It is a certainty that it is happening.
So, that's what I think the thing here is. And the executive orders that came out over the past summer, two of them talking about post-quantum encryption keys, every financial institution should be working their road map to getting PQC right now. Because waiting 2 years will be 2 years too late.
By the way, everyone on the panel certainty it's going to happen. Is that Can we raise our hands and agree?
It's scientifically
Scientifically, yeah. What about in the audience? How many people will you certainty? Okay, so there you go. You got a flavor of
Where are the believers?
Ryan, what's your take on this?
Yeah, I think this is this is difficult because quantum like AI there is a lot of hype. There's a lot of hype in the positive direction of what quantum can do to help drug discovery material science creating new new materials themselves changing the semiconductor processes and there's a lot of hype on the other side the cybersecurity side the scary piece. There is too much hype in the industry generally. I think when you look at what we need to look out for regulators for the business community for the fintech community. It's not what is a thousand cubits.
What is a million cubits? What does that mean? That is not a great benchmark. There's what's called logical cubits which is your own mentioned earlier. There's time to solution and I think most importantly the way in which artificial intelligence is coming together with quantum is speeding up the timelines both for the positive things that quantum will do as well as the negative things quantum will do.
So Katie mentioned some potential dates. This is an area where I spend a lot of my time on Capitol Hill talking about quantum to policy makers. This is one where I lean into the scary piece because Q day will be here at some point within the next decade. I think we would all have a different answer in terms of specific timeline. The most important thing is we don't know.
There will be no time when Wolf Blitzer comes on CNN and says it's Q day folks. That will not happen because the adversary who has access to a quantum computer that can run what's called Shore's algorithm and potentially break encryption for banks for the Fed for Swift would have zero incentive to tell the world that they've done so. They're going to try to capture as much of that valuable data. They're going to try to capture as much of those valuable Bitcoin wallets as possible. So we don't know when that day is coming.
It's not like Y2K in that way, but we know it is well within the time horizon for how to do encryption updates and that is the biggest takeaway today is that it is reasonable now to start this transition process.
So, there's this question about Q-Day. It's on the horizon. We don't know when.
It's real. It's happening.
It's happening.
Prepare.
But even if we even if you're looking at it in a you know in the long term, even today, right now, there are risks and challenges with this notion of harvest now and decrypt later. So, you could steal sensitive information and decrypt it later with quantum computing. So, the risks are present today.
Yep.
You know, so to Jerome and Robert, how should institutions be thinking about that? What should be the regulators be thinking about it? You know, do you have perspectives on how this transition would happen from your point of view?
Yeah, I think just to start, lawyers like to define things. So, we have we've heard things about this is happening and so forth. So, it gets to you know, when does a a reasonably foreseeable technological risk become something that creates is always a matter of legal obligation today. That's really what from a lawyer's perspective we're talking about here. So, things that are we've already said on stage, you know, I think scientifically we've proven that it's coming, right?
We understand we can identify what this risk is. Something's going to be decrypted. What is out there already? Does it need to remain protected and safe? So, even without a quantum computer today, there's there's there's risk because there's transmission of data that needs to remain encrypted for a long period of time.
So, harvest and harvest now and decrypt later is something that you're going to hear about. And perhaps maybe you can elaborate, but right now there is no legal mandate that fintech companies would do something specific related to quantum. However, I'll back into what the current regulations are that govern from each of the different government bodies and agencies uh that you have to do what's reasonable under the circumstances. So, now that you have knowledge of something, what do you do?
Right. Now, and then want to kind of um circle back to what Katie said in terms of like we're already seeing EO um you know, orders coming out now specifically on that from the the government, which means ultimately and we kind of talked about some of the in in the in the green room. It it's going to come to industry, right? And so, there are these uh capabilities that you can leverage now to actually be able to do that in a way
you go there, just on EO for everybody, executive order. So, this June an executive order really lays out what uh government agencies uh and others and you can speak to this much more clearly.
said the national security systems need to have a PQC strategy by the end of 2027. So, post-quantum cryptography, most of the the security systems I'm speaking from my time in the Department of Defense, Department of War, have you know, cryptography is something that is old but new, right? And it's expensive back in the day, it got less expensive further, but there's a lot of things that we didn't encrypt. And there are a lot of things that are at risk. So, the the president put out the executive orders and said, "National security systems, you must."
Well, how does that translate to you in the audience? Well, how many of you are providers to a national security system, a critical infrastructure provider, a telco, a a AWS? We're saying to them, "You need to have PQ strategy." Well, what does that mean, right? So, you post-quantum cryptography.
There are two algorithms by NSA that you can basically use. Will those remain? That is something that the AI question, along with quantum, is a very interesting question because things that we didn't think were possible a year ago are possible today because of the advancement of AI. And when you pull AI and quantum together, that's why I say Q-Day. There'll be your life before Q-Day and your life after Q-Day.
And Ryan, you said something that's a friend of mine wrote a paper. There is no second place in quantum, and what you said is exactly spot on. If China breaks Q-Day before we do, they're not going to go on the news and tell everyone. You're just going to see things starting to go wrong or things not working.
Yeah, we all planned up Jerome to keep you from talking more since you've already had your chance.
Exactly. I I get it.
That's right.
I [laughter] was going to I'm going to I'm going to talk for like 10 minutes, is it?
Exactly.
But but one but a couple more things.
Sure.
Uh this executive order, and Ryan, maybe it has some actual dates though by which PQC needs to be implemented.
2027.
2020 Get money and give the dates. 2027, but by 2035 every everything that's currently regulated or or identified under the executive order. But that's not applicable outside of what you just described to everybody there. So, these dates are important because they predict when would a a computer uh be able to break it. So,
The dates are important, and then there is this requirement of trying to figure out PQAC and have these strategies in place. Jerome, you are actually advising different entities on what that strategy looks like in practice from your perspective, AWS's perspective. What are the recommendations you're giving? What are those con- conversations actually entail in terms of the specifics around data migration, data handling, and all those
pieces.
Yeah. Um and you know, I was privy to the process that we use within Amazon. Again, we started really working on this in 2019, where we actually went through and what we could consider quantum safe our our network, right? And with that, I think the the main takeaway here is really establishing the rigor to be able to operationalize this change, right? So, like even if you were to say that you use the new ciphers that are out right now, what makes you say that those when and we call it cipher drift, meaning like it's always going to change.
Like you have a change management process in place to be able to do that. So, a couple of things to kind of think about is one taking inventory of and this is probably the most daunting task of all of the encryption and connections that you have currently within your your system. Identifying like solution providers that may be able to solve that. So, in this case in this case being on AWS, there are services that are already we use that are what we call a quantum safe or have what's called a hybrid quantum encryption like a key management service and things of that nature. But then there's always going to be some of the things that you own, right?
And then figuring out how you want to be able to solve that. There's several different ways to look at that. There's frameworks out there now. Amazon has one around quantum migration and how we we've done it and basically made that more of a best practice, a white paper that you can actually access online. You can use the way I would look at it is you want to very similar to what I I still say this is very applicable to like AI.
It's a new emerging technology. What is the rigor that you're going to put in place in this case to continue to keep inventory of your of your systems and where those encryption points are and creating the change management mechanism to keep up with the innovation that's happening within that space. I think the other thing too is to start to prioritize where the most critical assets that you have. Right? So, you're going to hear something around like basically looking for the most exposed data that has the longest encryption timeline, right?
Like if this needs to be encrypted for 20 years, someone can capture now, wait for 20 years, probably earlier like we're saying to actually be able to decrypt that data. So, those are the those are kind of like where I would prioritize and start from and then kind of work your way backwards from there.
So, that's at the institutional level. I think there's a question on everyone's mind here is that who has the greater quantum exposure? Is it traditional rails like Swift or is it crypto rails? Is it Bitcoin, Ethereum networks? And Ryan, you have a perspective on that and what that might look like.
Yeah, to the the high-level takeaway is that everyone's cryptography is at risk. There's RSA, there's elliptic curve cryptography at the base for all of this. So, every financial institution uh has data that's at risk. And if it's data that will be valuable
Risk that it would be decrypted
very easily. Okay. Yeah.
Quantum vulnerable, we'll call it. Uh the when a quantum computer with the requisite number of logical qubits exist, they can run the Shor's algorithm, there would be real risk. Um it's very different between traditional rails, um Fedwire, chips, Swift, and crypto. Uh crypto-currencies, not crypto crypto-cryptography, get a lot of discussion here of you'll see headlines even in very, you know, top-notch Wall Street Journal, "Quantum will break Bitcoin." And that is is true.
It will not break the blockchain that underlies it, but the wallets that are protected by cryptography in Ethereum, in Bitcoin, and the like are very much quantum vulnerable. So, what is the difference then between a traditional rail and cryptocurrency? A traditional rail, obviously, there's more surface area that could go wrong. Trillions of dollars of damages potentially if Swift was hacked by a quantum computer. The hard part is that huge service area for risk.
It would could take potentially between four and seven years to upgrade the cryptography. This is not an easy on or off switch. Just because these PQC algorithms from NIST exist, that does not mean all of a sudden we can snap our fingers and say, "It's fine. We're quantum safe." This is a long process one to figure out what is quantum vulnerable and to actually institute the algorithms.
So, the good thing for the traditional rails is that there's a very central way to upgrade cryptography and it can be done. It's very difficult. It will probably take 3, 4, 5 years, but it can be done in a centralized fashion once there's this acknowledgement of the risk and a willingness to do it. Uh you're already seeing that from uh Swift. Now, I want to get my dates right.
SwiftNet will be PQC enabled next year in 2027. So, this is being discussed as will be rolled out over the coming years. That's a positive. The mirror to that, unfortunately, is that cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin and Ethereum particularly, are very much uh at risk and the very nature of cryptocurrencies is to not have a centralized figure driving changes in things like cryptography. And so, what makes Bitcoin attractive to folks also makes it very, very difficult to upgrade.
So, Bitcoin, there are 7 million Bitcoin wallets that are quantum vulnerable. That's about a third of what's in supply. That's today about $600 billion. That also includes about a million wallets from the Satoshi era. So, this very kind of difficult question of do we freeze, burn, or leave exposed wallets becomes very much a difficult governance issue.
Much you know, not to mention the fact that you've basically got to do at least a soft fork to upgrade Bitcoin. Really, really hard governance issue. We know what the solution is. It's PQC migration, but hard to get the community on board and to start this process. Ethereum, this is the last thing and I'll hand it to Katie.
Ethereum has done a lot more than Bitcoin on this just as a as a baseline. The research foundation has really invested a lot of time, money. There's a clear plan. Ethereum is very much on the ball to do this, but it's a governance problem and Bitcoin has got a lot of work to do for this migration.
So, I'm just going to add another layer to it, right? So, our app, China, our EU partners have moved to something years ago called quantum key distribution, which is quantum proof. It's a way different It's not a mathematical, it's photons, it's light. And they have moved that way. Their actually their banking institutions are have they
As a way to mitigate this quantum exposure, yeah. So, it's starting earlier to respond
the bet and said, "You know what? We're not even going to bother with these algorithms. We're just going to new quantum key distribution." And we're kind of fighting one arm behind our back because NSA here in America does not like QKD.
Yes.
That does not mean that the financial sector should not be looking at and using QKD as a way to protect the most I I would say the holy grail. If you were to look at your artery, right? You need to get some QKD, quantum key distribution in there because to your point on Bitcoin wallets, you protect most our adversaries are protecting their wallets with QKD. So, we've got to take a stance and not wait for the government to come out and say, "You must." Because by the time the government tells you, it's going to be too late.
This is a a time in our lives where the government is trying its fastest to get to where it needs to be. Um my company was just awarded this past week DARPA, the quantum um benchmark initiative as one of the companies, IBM. But imagine out of all the Quantinuum, all of us doing quantum, three companies got awarded. The government cannot keep pace with this.
Yeah.
And I would just
Just to build on that, there already existing requirements and frameworks that your clients, institutions are facing. Do we need new requirements? Do we need more mandates?
So, so I think we can work within our current framework. However, with the QKD discussion, everyone in this room has an obligation to do what's reasonable as a reasonable organization when there is a force when you accept there's a foreseeable known risk. So, when this is when we work in a global environment, and you just said China
Yeah.
and everyone other than the United States, at some point in the future, and hindsight's always 20/20, we'll look back and there'll be a plaintiff's bar or somebody who says, "It would have been reasonable for you to take these actions at that time with regard to this information." And if the UK, the EU, China, and other countries are employing QKD today, why didn't you?
Right. Right. And I think one thing that to note here, too, cuz it's like, you know, we're talking about all these different, you know, uh acronyms like QKD, quantum uh key distribution, and there's also um post-quantum encryption, right? I think the key here is for each of the organizations, very similar to how that they have an uh you know, someone that's uh single-threaded leader for AI, you need someone for quantum specifically to start to figure these things out, cuz really QKD can be done in conjunction, right? Exactly, right?
It with that. So, it's really trying to explore what technology's out there now. And again, there are technologies that you can leverage now, but to me, I still go back to like creating the rigor within your organization to start to really
Jerome, you were 2018 you were appointed?
Uh oh, yes. Yeah, told him a minute back. Uh yeah. And And agree with you. They call me the quantum czar for world wide public sector.
So, yeah.
could put somebody on your team on point to be watching this.
That's right. That's a start.
And I think the first thing, you know, you're the crypto czar, I would crypto queen.
That's right. There you go.
Everybody
That's That's what I've been up to.
call me the crypto queen.
Bob, what are you?
We're the We're the crypto crypto brothers.
brothers.
[laughter]
The thing we should do with reasonable inquiry right now today is truly dedicate someone to look at your cryptographic library. It was in that executive order that you need to understand what you have in order to protect it, and you need to be able to prioritize, cuz this is not, as Ryan stated, a flip on and off switch. This has to be a quantum strategy, and your road map needs to be out there. Your C-suite needs to be aware of it. You need to start planning towards it.
Somebody in charge inventory it and by the way, how long did it take Swift if they're going to have it by next year? They started
Years ago.
Years ago.
Katie, just build on that a bit more. How how do we know we are on track in responding to this? Especially in the banking sector, how do we know at the institutional level, at the sectoral level we are on track?
So, I first of all the CISOs are critically important inside every institution and they should be the I would say the belly button if you were in every organization to look at and they should say, "Okay, where are we on our cryptographic journey? What are the systems that don't have any encryption or minimal encryption or RSA?" You know, and there's others, right? AES, I think we'll have a better shot, maybe last a couple of years longer. We're talking all out acronyms.
But, it's much like cybersecurity was 5 years ago. Nobody really talked about it until it was a thing and now it's a thing. You have to start the journey. So, go back, ask your CISO, ask your C-suite, your CFO should know what is going to be the strategy and if not, then like I said, the white the white paper that Jerome mentioned that Amazon has, companies like IonQ, Quantinuum, we all have things out there to look at. But, the easiest thing to do is you're holding, ask GPT.
I will tell you that super intelligence, not AI, the super intelligence actually has a lot more data in there. I mean, we were in the green room and I said, "You know, just ask, when did China implement QKD?" 2008.
Yeah.
And they put their critical infrastructure, their financial institutions in 2008 2008. Um the EU did the banking systems in 2021.
Yep.
And where are we? So, I mean, it's easy to get out there, start talking about it. Um and the the one thing I will say is it's a big word and it's been around for a minute is quantum. Don't be afraid to say I don't know. I I think that's the one thing I would walk away is when we started this journey, you're both lawyers.
What Are you a lawyer?
I'm not. No, we are not.
But I I mean, the first time I heard quantum, I was like, is that like the the TV show?
I I guess it is. I Like I said, I said, "Why? Why Why would they
What is it?" And
We're not going to rename that, too, right?
Ask [laughter] the questions. Find me out in the audience. Ask us questions. The the This is stuff that we need to discuss openly and and have conversations about because our national security is our economic security. They are two co- coalesced and I don't want to have to be forced to order Mandarin in Mandarin, okay?
How strongly do you feel about the difference between the day before Q Day and the day after Q Day?
it's night and day. So, everybody asked me, CIO of the Department of War, what what was the thing that would keep you up at night? I live downtown DC. If I could hear the birds in the morning, that's a bad day. Because that means everything else has stopped.
That's Q Day. And if China breaks it first, they're not going to call CNN or What do they call it? They see it on MSNBC change. They're not going to call. They're going to find the most vulnerable systems and it's not going to be massive.
And that's the difference. I the harvest now decrypt later I think they're going to focus on a secondary banking system, maybe like Houston in Houston, right? And the credit unions there that day don't work, right? And then they make a run on the market and the FDIC only has so much. That's where the adversary is, to cause distrust in enough for you to lean on them more than you lean on us.
I I I feel that my job as a moderator, as an investor, because all we've done is talk about risks. Huh. And all I want to talk about is the opportunities that might exist.
Huge opportunity of ever investment.
So, Ryan, what's your take on the opportunity landscape that's in front of us?
It it's huge, and that that is where this is a difficult conversation. Is quantum will in the long run change cybersecurity for the better, and it will change all of our lives for the better, particularly around drug discovery um and material science. These what I call quantum for good issues. Quantum computers will be able to solve problems that no classical computer can solve, uh and will make our lives better. It will also bring Q-day.
It will also break encryption. It will lead to I was a cybersecurity attorney before I came to quantum. It will lead to cyber attacks the likes of which we've never seen. And you have to hold both of those things in your mind at the same time, and that's difficult. Um for this room, for FinTechs, and for the banking sector, quantum will have huge positive use cases around portfolio optimization, running Monte Carlo simulations, doing AML and KYC alongside AI.
The financial industry has by far the most to gain from quantum. Uh when we think about pricing derivatives, when we think about those the positives, it also has the most to lose. And so, to Katie's last point, it's not going to be the big banks who will likely get hacked by a quantum computer. It's going to be a small community bank. It's going to be somebody's vendor.
It's going to be a much smaller institution that has uh connections to the larger banks.
your point being they have to invest in a response.
Correct. The systemic risk is huge.
No no one company or country can can deal with this with this alone. So, I think we'll get to the point in your questions like should there be regulation around this? I think attacking this today or dealing with this today our our current laws and regulations that apply to FinTech organizations kind of mandate you to be reasonable and to start taking action and doing things. However, to get the whole system, the whole ecosystem on track may require more poignant and and direct laws and regulations with specific deadlines. Okay.
Last question. I I I warned you that we would barely scratch the surface. You have to find these guys and chat with them. Okay, so the single most important thing an organization in the financial sector, you decide where in the ecosystem should do over the next 12 months. Single most important thing, what would it be?
Open to all of you. Maybe Katie, you look like you're ready with an answer, so you go first.
No, I mean, I think the first things first is, you know, you got to know what you're dealing with and you got to get to your cryptographic libraries. And you that is first things first. And then the secondary thing is prioritization versus, you know, resourcing, right? Cuz nothing is for free. So, you need to look at what are the most the Achilles' heel.
Um, and the way I can liken it in a way that I speak, um, the NC3 mission, the nuclear command and control for the Department of War is one of those big arteries that I would make sure is locked down day one. In your in how your data is transmitted outside of a data center. Look there first, right? that's where big data is moving, that's where the adversary would look to gain some some time. So, focus in on those arteries, prioritize, and then honestly do your research, go out, look at Gartner.
I mean, I I I'm always one to get I'm a Gartner, some days good, some days bad, but they've done a lot of work in this area. And look at the providers, at who can offer PQC. A lot of the cloud providers are providing PQC in in their capabilities.
work with Jerome is what you were saying.
Well, you don't have to even work with but know that there there are people out there, any vendor that you're working with. Do you have a strategy to get to PQC? What does it look like? These are conversations that you need to start having now. Don't delay.
Don't put this off.
Bob.
Um I would just piggyback on what's been said and that is if you don't know in your organization who's paying attention to this, then you have a problem. So, get somebody and when you refer to Jerome, it's someone like Jerome in your organization. It's your chief technology officer. You need to be having an ongoing discussion about this. That's why we're here today.
Ryan.
This is a board level risk. It should be addressed as such and two, put a PQC migration clause in your vendor and custodian contracts. You inherit their cryptography. You inherit their legacy systems. Don't let that be the backdoor that a potential quantum hack could go through.
Jerome, you have the final word.
Uh just two final things. I mean, I think we can talk about it. Have a single threaded leader specifically focused on quantum and again, I know we've talked about all of the the risk around that. I think that's a part of that risk to your mission and business, but also the benefits and where those apply and and having someone looking forward to that because there's going to be innovation just like artificial intelligence and it will be able to differentiate your mission and your business.
Thank you so much, guys. Join me in thanking our panelists.
Automatic transcript — names and jargon may be misspelled.